I thoroughly enjoyed this book. It is organized, detailed, and provides background and scope beyond the main topic.
The book covers the evolution of merchant convoys to Russia, past the North Cape to the ports of Murmansk and Archangel. It traces the genesis of the Arctic convoys from Mediterranean operations. The author describes how the Allies tailored their protection schemes using intelligence, lessons learned, and, eventually, quantitative and qualitative materiel superiority.
The subject matter covered is far broader than the title suggests, which is not a bad thing. Mr. Boyd devotes nearly the first quarter of the text laying the background for Arctic supply operations. The author recounts discussions between Prime Minister Churchill and President Roosevelt, discussions between their diplomatic and military staffs, and debates among British governmental committees. He weaves in early British encounters with Axis naval forces and their continuing code breaking efforts.
On the eve of the German invasion of Russia, the Allies were aware of German deployments in the East, as well as the need to provide support to Russia. However, the Allies were unsure of Russia’s ability to withstand a German attack, Germany’s intentions after (presumably) defeating Russia, and what form of aid to provide.
However, American and British leadership had different levels of enthusiasm for Russia. Roosevelt felt aid was vital to the Russian army, whereas the British, involved themselves in a wider war, were less eager. Mr. Boyd describes extensively the causes and results of these attitudes and includes copious statistics of how they affected Russian military potential.
German leaders formulated plans based on their own experience. Mr. Boyd describes how they devised an operational scheme, which combined input from numerous commands, as well as instructions from Hitler himself. Concurrently, the British made counterplans, based on superior signals intelligence and Mediterranean operations.
Although the Germans achieved results early on, by 1943, Allied convoy success became ever greater once the Royal Navy was better able to protect the merchant ships. Additional surface forces neutralized major German surface ships. ULTRA decrypts and close escort reduced the effectiveness of U-boats. Finally, the Germans were hampered by a lack of fuel and Hitler’s reluctance to risk capital ships. Ultimately, the advantages to the Allies became overwhelming, and convoy success rates exceeded 98 percent.
Two qualities of the text are worth comment. The first is the use of statistics comparing materiel supplied by the Allies to Russia’s overall fighting strength, war industry output, and gross domestic product. They provide a quantitative measure of the impact of the convoys and show how the supplied equipment made the difference between Russian resistance and collapse. The second is the refreshingly organized way Mr. Boyd presents his points. He states, for example, that there were five distinct benefits to a particular course of action and then proceeds to discuss each of the five. It gave this reader excellent literary signposts.
In all, this is a very interesting book. Although centered on the Arctic theater, Mr. Boyd’s expansive treatment of the external factors bearing on the Arctic and the general war effort, which influenced both sides, provides a big picture view of the tasks facing the combatants..